Published on Feb 2, 2026 • Updated on Oct 2, 2026
This article was written by Adem Tumerkan
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After the last BRICS summit, the buzz around "de-dollarization" and a BRICS currency is still making the rounds in mainstream media.
But my stance hasn't changed — because nothing fundamental has changed.
As I pointed out previously in "Is a BRICS Currency a Flawed Idea? I Think So — And Here's Why," BRICS nations have deep economic imbalances: massive surpluses, hoarded savings, and a heavy dependence on Western consumers to buy their exports.
Breaking from the dollar would require a complete overhaul of those economies. Despite all the noise, they're not ready for that - which is why a BRICS currency doesn't (and likely won't anytime soon) exist.
Let's look at what BRICS actually did, what they want, and what to expect.
The 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, was essentially a get-together of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) - plus new members like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and Egypt (the “+” in BRICS+). Together, they make up nearly half of the world’s population and a quarter of the global economy. This isn’t a group to ignore, and its influence is likely to grow as more nations look to join.
Here’s what they discussed:
While all these points matter, I believe Money Shifts takes priority - since it’s the one that could drive the rest.
So, will BRICS challenge the U.S. dollar?
Well, it can, but it will come at a very steep cost. Specifically for China
*Note that at the September 2026 New Delhi summit, BRICS officially abandoned its shared currency plans after member states refused to surrender domestic monetary control. Instead, the bloc pivoted toward linking existing payment systems like India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix to settle bilateral trade in local currencies. This retreat proves that bypassing Western payment plumbing is far easier than building a unified monetary union, leaving the dollar's reserve dominance intact.
A BRICS currency can’t realistically replace the dollar yet because most members are surplus countries that depend on net-selling into the global market and holding dollar assets.
None is willing to run the persistent trade deficits, open capital accounts, and crisis‑time lending needed to backstop a global reserve system.
Put simply, they want dollar independence without the dollar’s reserve role burden.
This is known as de-dollarization - reducing the dollar’s role in trade settlement, reserves, debt issuance, or payment systems.
Many BRICS countries talk a big game about moving away from the dollar.
But talk is cheap.
As I mentioned above (and covered in "How a BRICS Currency Could Work, Why It Isn't Likely, and What It Means for the Dollar"), BRICS is a collection of mostly export-driven economies.
Five of the nine BRICS+ nations currently run surpluses. Together, those surpluses add up to 3.5x the deficits - with China alone holding 75% of the surplus. These surpluses far outweigh what the deficit countries can absorb. That leaves BRICS nations still reliant on U.S. assets like Treasury bonds to balance their books.
Here's a simple way to think about it.
Imagine the world as a classroom. If Person A spends more than they earn, they borrow from Person B. Person A runs a deficit. Person B runs a surplus. They always balance. It works the same way with countries.
So as long as BRICS members keep running large surpluses with the West, they're stuck relying on the U.S. market - a massive deficit nation - and the dollar (since the U.S. pays with dollars).
As noted in our piece on the Global Currency Reset, any meaningful move away from the dollar would demand coordinated global effort - something neither BRICS nor the U.S. is positioned to achieve (yet).
Now, in an ironic twist of fate, if the U.S. were to clamp down on foreign purchases of its assets – such as preventing foreigners from buying bonds - these surplus countries would be forced to rebalance their economies and turn inwards, which could cause a lot of economic pain (as we’ve seen with China since 2021, this isn’t an easy thing to do.)
That’s why – contrary to what the mainstream believes - what Washington does with the dollar matters more to BRICS than any plans coming out of Moscow or Beijing.
Making matters more interesting, China is essentially the only country of scale in BRICS – so it would fall on their plate to do most of this rebalancing.
But here’s the catch: China’s reserves dominate (grey bar). Without China, the rest of the BRICS nations hold only a modest portion, underscoring China’s outsized influence in the bloc.
Meanwhile, hardly anyone uses BRICS currencies in international trade – such as the Russian Ruble, Indian Rupee, or South African Rand.
Why? Because progress in adopting BRICS currencies in global FX reserves remains slow, with only the Chinese yuan holding a modest 2% share over the past four years.
I believe three main factors limit this growth:
Put simply, BRICS+ countries don’t owe much money to other countries (relatively), so there isn’t much need for other countries to want or use BRICS money. And then there’s China, which has most of the BRICS+ savings. China would like to use its own money (the yuan), but the U.S. dollar is just way easier for everyone to use because there’s a lot of it, and it’s much easier to trade since anyone will accept it. So, for now, everyone sticks with the dollar.
Yet it’s also important to note that the use of these currencies has risen over the last two decades and will likely continue to.
For a BRICS currency to work, China would need to flood the world with yuan — acting as a global liquidity spigot, similar to how the U.S. supplies dollars to keep global trade moving.
China isn't willing to do that. Here's why:
Free-Floating Yuan - A true global reserve currency floats based on market demand. China prefers strict control over its currency to keep it cheap and competitive for exports. Letting it float freely would mean giving up that lever.
Manufacturing Dependency - China's manufacturing economy is massive and heavily subsidized by Beijing. Becoming a reserve currency anchor would disrupt that entire model.
Crisis Support - In 2020, the U.S. provided dollar swap lines to South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil during the COVID crisis. China, by contrast, tends to lock countries into debt cycles through the Belt and Road Initiative - showing no inclination to offer broad support or forgiveness.
The more yuan China injects globally, the harder it becomes to control - which puts its export model at risk. That's the core contradiction. And that's why China isn't ready to act as the key lender of last resort for a BRICS currency.
Launched in 2013, China’s BRI aimed to expand trade and influence by funding major infrastructure across Asia, Africa, and Europe. But this $1 trillion program has also created debt traps for borrowers - and for China. Over the last three years, more than $78 billion in BRI loans have soured, forcing China to restructure or write off debts, yet rarely offering outright forgiveness. About 80% of these loans went to countries now in debt distress, such as Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Zambia, sparking defaults and IMF bailouts.
And as more of these loans enter the repayment phase, significant debt distress is expected to increase in the coming year.
This experience is a hard lesson for China on the risks of international lending. It also raises the big question: would China flood the global economy with yuan if it meant risking inflation at home? Likely not.
Thus, without the yuan being suggested as a BRICS+ payment option – it shows the harsh reality for those pushing to “de-dollarize”.
For BRICS (specifically China) to meaningfully challenge the dollar, member nations would need to:
None are willing to do that yet. And without those structural changes, de-dollarization remains a slogan, not a strategy.
In short, a BRICS currency isn’t realistic in today’s world since BRICS nations themselves aren’t ready for it. So, keep this all in mind when you hear any hype about it. And remember, for now, that’s all it is – hype.
But regardless, BRICS’ influence will likely keep growing, with more countries gravitating toward membership - creating both winners and losers.
In the next issue of Morning Pour, I’ll dive into the potential upside of BRICS and emerging markets.
You won’t want to miss it.
Did BRICS drop its plans for a common currency? Yes, BRICS dropped its plans for a shared currency. At the September 2026 summit in New Delhi, officials confirmed they aren't working on a single tender. Instead of building a new currency to rival the dollar, the group wants national payment systems to work together. That lets members use systems like India's UPI and Brazil's Pix to settle trade in local cash.
Why is a common BRICS currency economically unrealistic? A shared currency needs a single central bank, shared fiscal rules, and deep capital markets. The BRICS economies are just too different. Most run big trade surpluses, and China holds most of the reserves. Member governments won't give up control over their own interest rates or exchange rates. Without that sacrifice, a euro-style currency union simply can't work.
What is BRICS Pay and how does it differ from a new currency? BRICS Pay is a cross-border payment network, not a brand-new currency. It links existing local systems so members can settle cross-border trade directly. That lets countries like India and the UAE settle bills in rupees or dirhams. Nations can skip Western clearing banks entirely without needing to mint a single shared coin or bill.
Can the Chinese yuan anchor a reserve currency for BRICS? No, the Chinese yuan can't anchor a reserve currency right now. A true reserve asset needs open capital accounts and free market rates. It also needs steady trade deficits that send cash abroad. China does the opposite. It keeps strict capital controls, manages its exchange rates, and pushes exports. Those policies stop the yuan from acting as an open reserve.
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